This study evaluates the disclosure of size revisions of seasoned stock offerings to determine what information is imparted to investors by the revision announcements. The results suggest not only that the announcements disclosure market- but not the firm-originating information; they also...

We examine the disclosure of size revisions of seasoned stock offerings to see what information revisions impart to investors. Revisions could deliver firm-originated information, which discloses something managers know about the firm. Alternatively, they could disseminate market-originated...

We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in...

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders must be circumscribed by some organizational or...