The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

We provide a detailed analysis of 4,103 compensation clawback provisions used by S&P 1,500 firms from 2000–2013. The adoption and breadth of a clawback provision are related to the scope for executive malfeasance, compensation-related reasons to misrepresent performance; and firm governance....

Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...

While existing literature on equity-based compensation is focused heavily on stock option and restricted stock awards that carry simple time-based vesting restrictions, we find that more complicated performance-based vesting provisions are quite common. We construct and analyze a novel dataset...

Panel OLS and GMM-IV estimates indicate that executives respond to the adoption of a compensation clawback provision by decreasing firm risk. The mechanisms that transmit incentives to decisions and decisions to risk appear to be more conservative investment and financial policies and preemptive...