We show that the first-price auction with no reserve price is the essentially unique mechanismthat is non-bossy, individually rational, and efficient in equilibrium. The first-price auction withoptimal reserve price is the essentially unique mechanism that is non-bossy, individually rational,and...

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Students participating in centralised admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students’ preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

We present a new characterisation of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance (APDA) rule (Gale and Shapley, 1962) in models of school choice. This is based on the notion of 'influence', introduced in Raghavan (2018), that agents may have on each other's welfare under bossy allocation rules. When...

In some labour markets, firms and workers are constrained to match with each other via intermediaries that mutually connect them. We study these markets via a model that synthesises tripartite matching with a `trading network' feature, by formulating a simple agency game in which intermediaries...

A desirable house allocation rule is flexible in its response to changes in agents' preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be `swap-sovereign' over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile...