This study analyzes the relationship between foreign suffrage and cooperation among nations, considering a three-stage game admitting strategic delegation twice. In the first delegation stage, each country chooses whether to allow foreigners to vote in the election of the country. In the second...

We study a model of two-candidate electoral competition.In our model, each voter has single-peaked preferences for the consequences of policies, but voters receive only partial information about which policies cause their preferred consequences. If voters' utility functions are convex, they...

We explore a simple twist of the canonical binary-state observational learning model wherein signal precision is common to all players but is unknown. We characterize the condition when an information cascade occurs and show that it is less likely to occur in our model compared with Bikhchandani...

We present a model describing an internal promotion race among individuals in different sectors where power shifts over time. The model includes a ratchet effect in which an employee attempts to manipulate their post-promotion reputation as a manager before they are promoted. The magnitude of...

We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...

We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...

We investigate a multi-agent moral-hazard model where agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even when each agent's probability of success in a project is independent, team incentives can be optimal. Because the agents are...

This paper studies the optimal contracts in a multitask model when a principal-agent relationship is long-term. If some outcomes are unverifiable, then the contracts have to satisfy the self-enforcing condition. I characterize the optimal contract in terms of the discount rate, the cost...