In the present paper a public bureau can extract additional budgetary allocations, not only by misreporting its production cost to its oversight committee but also by 'influencing' the perceptions of the public at large. I juxtapose the bureau's ability to influence the public with its ability...

In this paper analyze the economic incentives that govern the strategic relationship between the government and the independent media has been analysed using a consistent analytical framework.The analysis focuses on the extent to which the‘free’ press can act as a deterrent to...

In this paper, we present a general model of media capture where a government attempts to buy-out media firms in order to engage in corruption with relative immunity. In particular, we relax the assumption made by Besley and Prat (2005) that each firm would individually be able to completely...

In this paper a public bureau can extract surplus value from the services it provides not only by misrepresenting its production costs to its oversight committee but also by influencing the perceptions of the legislative body such as the parliament or the congress and the public at large by...

I critically review recent studies that estimate those costs of violence and conflict that can emerge among organized political groupings, from states, religious and ethnic organizations to guerillas and paramilitaries. The review includes studies that estimate direct and indirect costs due to...