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The information paradox in a monopolist's credence goods market

Jost, Peter-J.; Reik, Steffen; Ressi, Anna - 2019

the verifiability of the quality provided and the expert's liability. In this paper, we identify the information … the expert's liability for determining whether informed customers have real effects on market outcomes. On the other hand … and in contrast to traditional models, the verifiability of the quality provided is only of secondary importance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286246

Expert costs and the role of verifiability

Li, Jianpei; Ouyang, Yaofu; Zhang, Wanzhu - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 180 (2024) 1, pp. 17-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487206

The economics of professional services : lemon markets, credence goods, and C2C information sharing

D'Andria, Diego - In: Service business 7 (2013) 1, pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728585

Misconduct in Credence Good Markets

Brown, Jennifer - 2012

We examine misconduct in credence good markets with price taking experts. We propose a market-level model in which price-taking experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm's brand and their own skill. We test the predictions of the model using sales complaint data for exclusive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096847

Beliefs, Credence Goods and Information Campaigns

Colombo, Ferdinando; Ursino, Giovanni - 2021

We study the role of beliefs about experts' honesty in a market for credence goods with second opinions and overtreatment. Experts are honest or dishonest. The population shares a common belief about the share of honest experts, which may be incorrect. We characterize the belief that maximizes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242253