A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies' diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens' capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase...

I reexamine Hirschman's classic text Exit, Voice, and Loyalty through a game-theoretic interpretation of the relationship between exit and voice. The model, which is general and applicable to diverse environments, treats exit as a costly decision which may be prevented through an appropriate...

How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? I use an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to re-examine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the...

This research is devoted to political and economic aspects of closed democracy institutions afoot. The book describes basic approaches to contrastive analysis in this field, typical problems that cause deviations in democratic institutional system’s development and major conditions and ways to...

This research is devoted to political and economic aspects of closed democracy institutions afoot. The book describes basic approaches to contrastive analysis in this field, typical problems that cause deviations in democratic institutional system’s development and major conditions and ways to...

In this paper we empirically derive the welfare effects of a shift from joint taxation with full income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation in Germany. For the empirical welfare evaluation we estimate the preference heterogeneity in the population and use normative...

We present a model of optimizing government behavior in which a need for increased revenue leads to the introduction of a new revenue source, such as a VAT, accompanied by a reduction in income taxes. We argue that this is a plausible outcome for the United States, in view of international...

In this paper we empirically derive the welfare effects of a shift from joint taxation with full income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation in Germany. For the empirical welfare evaluation we estimate the preference heterogeneity in the population and use normative...

This paper investigates the politicians' incentives to pursue income redistribution when governments are constrained to levy taxes on labor income and this creates distortions. Politicians who strive to be elected may strategically redistribute through in-kind rather than cash transfers and...

Most modern economies tax both consumption and labour income. While there is an extensive normative literature on the optimal mix of the two taxes, there is little examination of what determines the actual mix in a well specified political economy context. We use a multi-dimensional spatial...