We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. The effect is stronger when the local newspaper is more...

A recent trend is that firms prefer to hire generalist CEOs with transferable skills (across firms or industries) over hiring specialist CEOs, but the consequences of this trend are unclear. In this study, we examine whether credit rating agencies consider a CEO’s general skills as a credit...

We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO...

We find that banking relationships built through institutional cross-ownership influence the granting of loans as well as loan contract terms. Specifically, firms newly added to institutional cross-owners’ portfolios are more likely to borrow from banks that previously issued loans to other...

We examine the supply-side determinants of debt covenants included in loan agreements. Controlling for borrower characteristics, we find evidence that the covenants that lead arranger banks include in new contracts persist into future contracts for at least three years. We document that this...