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Determinants of Strategic Executive Pay Disclosure : Evidence from Korea

Hwang, Iny - 2013

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086108

Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure : Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Grund, Christian - 2013

We investigate two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a firm's long-term wage policy. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second claims that bonuses act as complements to an executive's internal career. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091169

Minimizing Top Management’s Corruption : Delaying Bonus Compensations

Galadari, Abdulla - 2013

In an imperfect world, it is very challenging to control corruption of top executives and boards of directors. The general rule is that members of the top management and boards of directors are compensated with large sums of annual bonuses, depending on the corporate financial performance of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092212

The Effect of Social Interactions on Executive Compensation

Huang, Qianqian - 2014

We investigate whether and how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, we report that socially connected CEOs receive significantly more similar compensation than non-connected CEOs. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064933

Ten Myths of 'Say on Pay'

Larcker, David F. - 2014

Say on pay is the practice of granting shareholders the right to vote on a company's executive compensation program at the annual shareholder meeting. Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, publicly traded companies in the U.S. are required to adopt say on pay. Advocates of this approach believe that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065901

The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts

Lund, Andrew - 2014

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058

Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms : The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay

Gordon, Jeffrey N. - 2014

value of a diversified shareholder portfolio because of an increased level of systemic risk. Thus diversified shareholders … of a financial firm generally internalize systemic risk whereas managerial shareholders and blockholders do not. This … means that the governance model drawn from non-financial firms will not fit financial firms. Regulation that limits risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069658

Public Opinion and Executive Compensation

Kuhnen, Camelia M. - 2014

We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992-2008 the negativity of press coverage of CEO pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069846

The Role of Executive Stock Options as Insurance for CEOs Against Hold-Up

Jones, Edward A.E. - 2013

Following Oyer (2004) and Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006), we provide evidence that the level of stock option compensation results from outside opportunities in the managerial labor market for a sample of 3,214 CEO-year observations from S&P1500 companies between 1996 and 2010. We argue that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074659

Earnings Management from the Bottom Up : An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix - 2012

Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The previous literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112655