We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...

In recent years firms have been shifting their executive compensation packages from plain stock and option grants to grants with accounting-based performance vesting provisions and awards that benchmark firm performance against those of a designated peer group. One potential explanation for this...

This paper (forthcoming in Research in International Business and Finance) examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than...

We study the dynamics of managerial influence and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) compensation over the course of financial distress during 1992 to 2012. Using a matching estimator to identify suitable controls, we find that under distress firms reduce managerial board appointments, intensify...

We examine the effect of corporate governance on both CEO compensation and several financial performance indicators in a sample of Dutch hospitals. In a series of pooled regressions, we find evidence that supports earlier findings in the literature. For instance, our results indicate that the...

We use an unanticipated court ruling in a lawsuit against Citigroup claiming corporate waste related to CEO pay to analyze court intervention as an alternative governance mechanism in cases of excess pay. We find a negative relation between announcement returns and excess pay, consistent with...

We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors. Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid to the top...

While previous literature linked certain corporate governance mechanisms to stronger CEO‘s compensation shielding from restructuring charges, this study investigates the impact of shareholders ownership characteristics, distinguishing between institutions ownership vs. managerial ownership. We...

We provide the first evidence of significant external labor market penalties when directors fail to properly oversee executive compensation. When shareholders express disapproval through low Say-On-Pay (SOP) support, equity values decrease at firms linked by a shared director (interlocking...