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This academic presentation is based on the slides we prepared for delivery by one of us at the Federal Trade Commission hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century on December 6, 2018, which focused on common ownership. The slides discuss the implications of our research...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896936
This paper examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big Three index fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868749
Contested director elections are a central feature of the corporate landscape, and underlie shareholder activism. Shareholders vote by unilateral proxies, which prevent them from “mixing and matching” among nominees from either side. The solution is universal proxies. The Securities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968867
In 2012, the New York Stock Exchange changed its policies to prevent brokers voting shares on corporate governance proposals where they had not received instructions from beneficial owners. Although the change was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970071
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We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854199
Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and environmental behavior of U.S. corporations through their votes on social responsibility resolutions. However, the outcomes of many social responsibility resolutions are distorted, because the largest shareholders – institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993261
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Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for the meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas:” in 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216298