This paper studies the impact of female executives on the performance and risk taking of US banks. With a sample of US banks from 2002 to 2010, we find that the inclusion of female executives increases bank performance after addressing endogeneity and reverse causality issues. We also provide...

Would Lehman Sisters have saved the financial industry from the 2008 financial crises? We provide the first empirical test of this hypothesis by investigating how female executives impact bank risk-taking using US bank panel data from 2002 to 2010. Controlling for a wide range of factors...

If a bank faces potential insolvency, it will be tempted to reject good loans and accept bad loans to shift risk onto its creditors. We analyze effectiveness of buying up toxic mortgages in troubled banks, buying preferred stock, and buying common stock. If bailouts for banks that are deemed...

This paper examines changes in executive compensations structure following restatements of prior period earnings, and whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) influences how firms react to accounting misreporting when they modify their CEO compensation contracts. Based on a sample of...

This study solves the optimal managerial compensation problem when shareholders are either naiuml;vely optimistic or rational. The results suggest that boards of directors should decrease option grants to CEOs when equity is likely to be irrationally overvalued at the date when the CEO's options...

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of...