The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that governance structure and contractual form are two distinct concepts and that they should not be used interchangeably in both theoretical and empirical studies of transaction cost economics. Specifically, the choice of governance structure does not...

This paper contends that there is an important distinction between governance structure and contractual form, and that organizational boundaries, defined by governance structures, need not explain contractual form. The basic idea is that governance refers to the general environments and...

Cognitive biases play an important role in creating and perpetuating problems that lead to foodborne illness outbreaks. By using insights from behavioral ethics, we argue that sometimes people engage in unethical behavior that increases the likelihood of foodborne illness outbreaks without...

Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the...

This paper distinguishes between two types of ethical problems. A Type I ethical problem is one in which there is no consensus as to what is ethical. A Type II ethical problem is one in which there is a consensus as to what is ethical, but incentives exist for individuals to behave unethically....

The (un)fairness of agricultural markets is frequently invoked, especially by farmers. But fairness is difficult to define and measure. In this paper we link fairness and power with the concept of constrained choice to develop a framework for assessing fairness in agricultural markets. We use...

The purpose of this paper is to model trust in a principal-agent relationship in which the alternative to trusting is a costly action taken by a principal to observe and verify an agent's performance. In this model a decision not to trust is a decision to monitor rather than quit, where...

This paper examines the concepts of trust and trustworthiness in the context of a one-sided variation of the prisoner's dilemma, and it evaluates four different categories of solutions to the PD problem: changing player preferences, enforcing explicit contracts, establishing implicit contracts,...

In this paper I present an approach to teaching about and defining bribery that starts with the presumption that a payment, once defined as a "bribe," is prima facie unethical. That is, I make no distinction between "good bribes" and "bad bribes." In short, bribery cannot be justified. In this...

This paper presents a model of trust in which a principal chooses either to trust or monitor an agent who, in turn, chooses either to honor or exploit that trust. The principal's decision of whether to trust or monitor is based on the relative temptation an agent faces to exploit the principal's...