This paper studies the welfare impact of reputation/feedback systems in markets where both adverse selection and moral … reputation system is implemented, I find that 95 percent of total welfare loss from asymmetric information is eliminated. I also … consider a policy intervention that protects borrowers from accidental loss of reputation. My results suggest that introducing …

We analyze how reputation concerns for expertise of a partially informed decision maker affect her ability to extract … information from reputation-concerned advisors. Very high reputation concerns of the decision maker destroy her incentives to seek …'s reputation concerns maximizes advice-asking without undermining advisors' incentives. Thus, differently from most of the …

's stock price increases. Further, independent directors with high reputation incentives serve firms that voluntarily disclose … reputation incentives of independent directors. Our results therefore support a causal interpretation of the positive influence … that independent directors with reputation incentives exert on corporate transparency …

experts' incentives to defraud their customers when experts can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is …