This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, this indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence...

I collect 1,186 reported estimates of long-run value creation from 49 studies and present the first meta-analysis of the literature on shareholder activism and its effect on firm value in the longrun. This synthesis is necessary because shareholder activism is increasing over time and across...

Shareholder activism constitutes an increasingly prominent feature of corporate governance landscape. There is a controversy in prior research over whether and how much value activism creates. We examine whether estimates of the impact of shareholder activism are published selectively in prior...

In this paper we reexamine the findings of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and find the link between corporate governance (as measured by the G index and E index) and firm stock returns is much weaker than previously suggested. We extend the sample...

In this study, using a comprehensive dataset on business media coverage and textual analysis of the discussions in firms' quarterly earnings conference calls, we show that firms whose management fail to satisfy the demand for information, ceteris paribus, receive less media coverage. Poor...

Using text-based media content, this paper develops and empirically confirms a theory that explains how the media predicts takeover outcomes. It shows that positive media content about the acquirer predicts takeover success. Relative to other predictors proposed in the literature, the media...

Firstly, this paper brings forth an encompassing definition of investment funds intended to track down some patterns of deviant governance. Secondly, it will focus on three conspicuous types among those funds: banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Such approach seeks to reveal deep similarities...

Negative risk-decoupling, otherwise known as empty voting, is a popular strategy amongst hedge funds and other activist investors. In short, it is the attempt to decouple the economic risk from the share's ownership position, retaining in particular the voting right without risk. This paper uses...

When facing hedge fund activists, target firms often fight back. Targets with agency problems and those confronting the threat of investor coordination frequently engage in hostile resistance by implementing governance changes associated with managerial entrenchment. The market negatively...

We study whether managers' industry experience matters for hedge fund activism. We find that hedge fund managers with previous executive and outside director experience in target industries hold target shares longer and are more likely to serve as directors on target boards than those without...