This paper studies children as a risky asset associated to an investment option. Children provide utility but have a stochastic maintenance cost. We obtain several new results relative to models where children are deterministic goods, among which: i) Higher child risks diminish fertility and...

We study the optimal hiring and firing decisions of a firm under two different firing costs regulations: 1) Dual labor markets characterized by high firing costs for workers workers". 2) The Single Labor Contract, a policy proposal to make firing costs increasing in seniority at the job. We...

We study the hiring and firing decisions of a firm in a Dual Labor market and in a Single Labor Contract. Under both regulations, to fire before a certain seniority threshold is similar to an American option that gives the right of firing at low costs. However, the value of the option is...

We study the effects of news about sea level rise on housing markets. We exploit a natural experiment in Spain. In 2014 Greenpeace published an alarming report predicting catastrophic consequences for La Manga, a tourist peninsula. The report was widely cited in the local news. We find that the...

This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the debate on what caused the "global imbalances". On the empirical side, I provide different types of evidence to support that housing demand shocks (shocks to the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between housing and...

In this paper we study a new factor that matters for fertility and consumption decisions: the risks associated with having and raising a child. We analyze a real options model with incomplete markets to explicitly model both children as a risky investment and the parental option to time...

I model global imbalances as arising from changes in preferences for housing relative to tradable goods. The key ingredients in the model are labor reallocation across sectors and consumption smoothing between housing and tradable goods. Countries import goods during periods when more domestic...

We propose a quantitative model of lending standards with two reasons for inefficient credit: lenders' moral hazard from deposit insurance or government guarantees, and imperfect information about the persistence of asset price growth, which generates incorrect but rational beliefs in the...