Does enhanced legal accountability of non-director executives improve workplace safety? We exploit an exogenous increase in executive legal accountability triggered by Delaware Supreme Court’s 2009 “Gantler ruling” to address this question. In a difference-in-differences framework, we show...

In a dynamic model of originate-to-distribute lending, we examine whether reputation concerns can incentivize a bank to monitor loans it has sold. Investors believe that banks with fewer recent loan defaults are more likely to monitor ("have higher reputation''). In equilibrium, banks monitor...

We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large-scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the...

Previous empirical studies that decompose the bid-ask spread were done when securities traded in discrete price points equal to one-sixteenth or one-eighth of a dollar. These studies concluded that inventory and adverse-selection costs were economically insignificant compared to order-processing...

In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with strong and independent risk management functions have lower enterprise-wide risk. We hand-collect information on the organizational structure of the risk management function at the 74 largest publicly-listed BHCs, and...

Using a large loan sample from 1990 to 2006, we examine why firms form new banking relationships. Small public firms that do not have existing relationships with large banks are more likely to form new banking relationships. On average, firms obtain higher loan amounts when they form new banking...