This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and...

This paper investigates the relationship between secure implementability (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2007</CitationRef>) and full implementability in truthful strategies (Nicolò in Rev Econ Des 8:373–382, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">2004</CitationRef>). Although secure implementability is in general stronger than full implementability...</citationref></citationref>

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely...

This paper studies the relationship between no-envy (Foley, D. (1967) "Resource allocation and the public sector," Yale Economics Essays 7, pp.45-98) and dominant strategy implementability in non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. The main result shows that the...