Showing 31 - 40 of 253,239
This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964677
Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are … significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043231
We employ a unique sample of 5000 outside directorships held by German executive bank directors over 1993-2015 to … circumstances of executive directors' appointments and bank performance with bank-fixed-effect and difference …-in-differences estimations to show that outside directorships enhance value for the bank and improve executives' career outcomes, mostly because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987769
This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US … positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic … shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030722
of the 2007 financial crisis. Using intra-bank variations, it provides empirical evidence that banks with overconfident … overconfident managers. Endogenous manager selection as a reaction to illiquid markets, as well as signaling or the use of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031548
This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012998312
This paper studies whether banks charge higher or lower interest rates on loans to firms with overconfident CEOs. It establishes a theoretical model to show the relationship between the loan rate and overconfidence of the borrowing firm's CEO. It also conducts empirical analyses to test the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000941
We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable … bank performance appears to be unaffected by the bonus cap. Risk hikes are consistent with an insurance effect associated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321323
This study outlines a new theory linking industry structure to optimal employment contracts and executive short-termism. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remuneration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905627
This paper investigates how bank CEO risk-taking incentives influence bank lending decisions. Consistent with the … standards in bank loan contracts to pursue higher compensation. We find that banks with a high vega tend to charge a … create an agency problem between a bank manager and shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867107