Showing 1 - 10 of 104,594
Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545128
In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584560
of experimentation is suboptimal, taking decisions by direct democracy, or electing risk-loving politicians, could …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159525
We construct a model in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. We show that a candidate's strategy on which issue to focus on (i.e., campaign messages) can be a signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949300
We analyze a model of political competition in which the elite forms endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014322896
In this paper, we address empirically the trade-offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians. In order … counterparts (”politicians”). We evaluate how performance would change if the courts replaced majority rule with unanimity rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194725
election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher … results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978149
election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher … results suggest that over-reliance on elections to discipline politicians is misplaced. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594150
I study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition in which unelectable fringe candidates with extreme policy platforms are an integral part of the political process. When the preferences of voters change over time, and there are restrictions on political parties changing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189677
What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218