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This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160294
This paper explores the labor market returns to working on a victorious political campaign. Using unique administrative data from Brazil, we track the earnings and employment of campaign workers before and after close elections spanning nearly 20 years. We identify sizable returns to working for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014281242
Union institutions, and so on). Many politicians get into office through a democratic election, while others are selected or …Politicians are persons involved in the process of public policymaking in their role as members of governments … appointed to a public office. For many politicians politics is a full-time job, while for others it remains an activity in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907716
We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in … describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running … public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters want to control …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064658
have a down-up characteristic. We show that voters cannot motivate politicians to invest in down-up policies by their … macroeconomic developments. Finally, we comment on practical issues when such contracts are used in election races …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188188
A campaign model in which candidates can make law announcements for reforms in the next term will be considered. Acquiring information about these laws incurs the candidates a certain cost. The conditions under which a candidate acquires information about a given law during the campaign will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075256
When reelection is uncertain, the election mechanism may provide insufficient incentives to politicians to implement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075458
This paper studies the relationship between incumbents' performance and political polarization, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a spatial model of political competition in which the voters use the incumbent's performance in office to update their beliefs about his competence. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418010
This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parliament who votes against the leader's policy. A competent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346481
We show that a large electorate of ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive very noisy signals about her performance. We find that the accountability problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019971