a firm with a low reputation to reestablish itself. But, the ability to promote can crowd out incentives for investment … at high reputations; the firm allows its reputation to decay more before it is renewed relative to a firm motivated by …

We study a firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be … investment– depend only on the firm's reputation. MPE vary in frequency of certification and payoffs, but are generally …

A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high quality … results provide an explanation to empirical findings of reputation failures in developing countries. I also discuss the …

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time …

We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the … long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state that determines the monitoring structure in the reputation … sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and the type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting …