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March, Christoph - 2016

The paper investigates social-learning when the information structure is not commonly known. Individuals repeatedly interact in social-learning settings with distinct information structures. In each round of interaction, they use their experience gained in past rounds to draw inferences from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996206

Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders

Margaria, Chiara - 2017

We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders' private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem — that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949504

A New Approach to the Analysis of Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Kartal, Melis - 2018

The theory of infinitely repeated games lacks predictive power due to equilibrium multiplicity and its insensitivity to … approach, which mitigates the shortcomings of the theory. In particular, we study a standard infinitely repeated prisoner … boost cooperation and coordination on cooperation relative to the standard game, unlike what a theory based on pure material …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913715

Misinformation and Optimal Time to Detect

Choi, Jin Hyuk - 2020

We study a continuous-time reputation game in which an informed player bene ts from persistent private information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848246

Dynamic Quality Signaling with Moral Hazard

Dilme, Francesc - 2012

Asymmetric information is an important source of inefficiency when assets (like firms) are transacted. The two main sources of this asymmetry are unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the asset (for example, quality) and unobserved idiosyncratic choices (actions done by the current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170975

Endogenous Offer Arrival in the Market for Lemons

Aghamolla, Cyrus; Hashimoto, Tadashi - 2022

We allow buyers to choose the timing of offers in a dynamic adverse selection model with a single seller. Buyers have private information and can delay their one-time private offers to learn from other buyers by observing trading behavior. We find that the equilibrium exhibits maximum delay in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014238833

Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game : The Role of Cohort Effects

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - 2015

We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects and discuss when they arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074345

Rational Groupthink

Harel, Matan; Mossel, Elchanan; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer - 2018

We study how effectively long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing each others’ actions. We find that in the long run, information aggregation fails, and the fraction of private information transmitted goes to zero as the number of agents gets large. With Normal signals, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036576

Market-Minded Informational Intermediary and Unintended Welfare Loss

Xu, Wenji; Yang, Kai Hao - 2022

This paper examines the welfare effects of informational intermediation. A (shortlived) seller sets the price of a product that is sold through a (long-lived) informational intermediary. The intermediary can disclose information about the product to consumers, earns a fixed percentage of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295534

Signaling with Private Monitoring

Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2022

reputation are examined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310444