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Optimal Team Formation Under Asymmetric Information
Kambhampati, Ashwin; Segura-Rodriguez, Carlos - 2021
How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217251
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Team Design under Moral Hazard
Starmans, Jan - 2020
This paper studies team design in the context of a standard risk-neutral principal-agent model with contractual …' technologies in a team in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. I characterize optimal team design and … principal may be biased to hire an inefficiently small team. The results have implications for the heterogeneity of agents in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832543
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Incentive Contracts for Teams : Experimental Evidence
Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2015
interaction among team members positively affects the principal's payoff. Greater team cooperation is successfully induced with … communication on team cooperation in the absence of ongoing team interaction. Fostering communication among team members does not … significantly affect the principal's payoff, suggesting that agents' communication is an imperfect substitute for ongoing team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145295
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Performance Peer Groups in CEO Compensation Contracts
Bakke, Tor-Erik - 2020
chosen. These findings suggest managers may have some influence on the choice of performance peers. Lastly, using a quasi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839697
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Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720579
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Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685891
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Teams, Firms, and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior
Rose, David - 2000
production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the … team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159217
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A theory of firm decline
Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas F.; Di Giannatale, Sonia - 2010 - This version: July 20, 2009
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732070
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Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743908
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Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009690725