We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC, and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of a payment instrument depend on the number of...

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC, and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of a payment instrument depend on the number of...

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of...

Lenders can exploit households' payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and credit conditions. We study how the introduction of an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects...

Lenders can exploit households' payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and credit conditions. We study how the introduction of an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects...