We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to...

We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to...

We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to...

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...

US power ‘elites’ are substantially less fair-minded than ‘non-elite’ general populations claims a study by Ray Fisman and coauthors [Science 349, 6254 (2015)]. This supposedly explains why US governments, run by people less fair than the citizens they represent, have been uninclined to...

We conducted a large number of continuous double auction experiments under private information and in other treatments where even less information is available. Our experiments are designed to investigate convergence to competitive equilibrium, in particular to go beyond rejection by...