I develop a dynamic investment game with a "memoryless" R&D process in which an incumbent and an entrant can invest in a new technology, and the entrant can also invest in the old technology. I show that an increase in the probability of successfully implementing a technology can cause the...

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of...

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is...

We focus on the estimation of market entry costs that are declining over time and evaluate their impact on competition and market performance. We employ a dynamic oligopoly model in which firms make entry, exit, and production decisions in the presence of declining entry costs and learning by...

In this article we propose an innovative way of delineating geographical markets based on easily accessible data. We apply this concept for the day care industry and investigate providers' location choices relative to local market characteristics to evaluate the widespread presumption that local...

This paper evaluates how different lengths of entry regulation impact market structure and market performance using a dynamic structural model. We formulate an oligopoly model in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and allow entry costs to vary over time. Firms have the opportunity to...

We model the conditions under which incumbent firms may purposefully create an intellectual property commons such that no firm has the incentive to invest in new product development, despite the potential profitability of a public sector invention. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate...

I propose a computational model of industry evolution capable of matching many stylized facts. It views the firm as a myopic but adaptive entity whose survival depends on its ability to perform various activities with greater efficiency than its rivals. In this model, the shakeout pattern arises...

Since the mid-1970s, firm entry rates in the United States have declined significantly. This also holds for other OECD countries over the past years. At the same time, these economies experienced a gradual process of population aging. Applying a tractable life-cycle model with endogenous firm...