Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance...

We analyze …firms incentives to bundle and tie in the telecommunications industry. As a fi…rst step, we develop a discrete-choice demand model where fi…rms sell products that may combine several services in bundles, and consumers choose assortments of different types of products available...

In a model with manufacturer and retailer competition, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer cartels when retailers have an outside option to selling the manufacturer's product. Because retailers have an effective outside option, the manufacturer can only ensure contract acceptance by...

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only...

Something old and important is lost sight of in a case like Ohio v. American Express, the Supreme Court's recent adoption of "platform" or "two-sided market" theory in American antitrust, and in theoretical efforts like the one on which it is based. A rarely discussed idea built in to American...

Platform businesses have been pivotal in the rise of the digital economy. Amazon is one example of a platform taking on the role of a quasi-regulator; an entity that is able to determine the terms of interaction on the platform. This intermediary position entails the danger of anti-competitive...

This paper deals with the application of the SIEC test in German merger control using the decision by the Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) in the Edeka/ Kaiser’s Tengelmann case (file no. B2-96/14) as an example. The focus is on two aspects which are of particular interest from...

The competitive strategies of `gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the...

We study empirically the price effects of upstream cartels that sell through downstream retailers to final consumers. We focus on a German coffee producer cartel that colluded under two different regimes: (i) involving wholesale prices in 2003 and (ii) with additional resale price maintenance...

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only...