A profit-maximizing Seller has a single unit of a good to sell. The bidders have a pure common value that is drawn from a distribution that is commonly known. The Seller does not know the bidders' beliefs about the value and thinks that beliefs are designed adversarially by Nature to minimize...

We consider a situation where a decision maker gathers information from two or more imperfectly informed experts. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on...

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent...

We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action...

This paper investigates a contest in information revelation between firms that seek to persuade consumers by revealing positive own information and negative information about the rival. In the face of limited bandwidth, firms are forced to make a trade-off between disclosing their own positive...

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize’s location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e.,...

We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort and commits to it before observing the...

We investigate cheap talk when an imperfectly-informed expert observes multiple binary signals about a continuous state of the world. The expert may report either information on each signal separately (direct transmission) or a summary statistics of her signals (indirect transmission) to a...

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...