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Contingent contracts in banking : insurance or risk magnification?

Gersbach, Hans - 2018 - This version: November 2018

We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932411

Intermediation spread, bank supervision, and financial stability

Özyıldırım, Süheyla - In: Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies 13 (2010) 4, pp. 517-537

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008987305

Bank liquidity, bank lending, and "bad bank" policies

Morrison, Alan; Wang, Tianxi - University of Essex / Department of Economics - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013162737

Sticky deposit rates and allocative effects of monetary policy

Duquerroy, Anne; Matray, Adrien; Saidi, Farzad - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648465

Financial fragility, uninsured deposits, and the cost of debt

Quijano, Margot - In: The North American journal of economics and finance : a … 24 (2013), pp. 159-175

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009739660

The limits of market discipline in reducing banks' risk taking

Blüm, Jürg M. - 2000

This paper analyzes the influence of market discipline on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that market discipline reduces risk if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk before the interest rate on deposits is set. If, however, the bank can readjust the level of risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398285

Capital adequacy, deposit insurance, and the effect of their interaction on bank risk

Jumreornvong, Seksak; Chakreyavanich, Chanakarn; … - In: Journal of risk and financial management : JRFM 11 (2018) 4, pp. 1-18

This paper investigates how deposit insurance and capital adequacy affect bank risk for five developed and nine emerging markets over the period of 1992–2015. Although full coverage of deposit insurance induces moral hazard by banks, deposit insurance is still an effective tool, especially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960605

A pure bureaucratic-entrepreneurial theory of deposit insurance adoption

Chu, Kam Hon - In: Review of Economic Analysis : REA 13 (2021) 3, pp. 253-291

even though policymakers are aware of its pitfalls in both theory and practice. In our model, the regulator acts as both a … bureaucrat and an entrepreneur to maximize his self-interest through administering a deposit insurance scheme. The theory …. Empirically our theory is supported by the stylized facts, cross-country binary-choice regression results and a case study of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886290

Funding deposit insurance

Oosthuizen, Dick; Zalla, Ryan - 2022

We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332900

Securitization and moral hazard : evidence from a lender cutoff rule

Bubb, Ryan; Kaufman, Alex - 2009

perapplicant fixed costs in screening. We then demonstrate that our theory fits the data better than the main alternative theory … already in the literature, which supposes cutoff rules are exogenously used by securitizers. Furthermore, we use our theory to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941871