The convex payoffs for equity holders in a corporate structure results in agency costs and moral hazard problems. The implicit government guarantee for banks accentuates these. We believe that the Basel III related bail-in contingent convertible (CoCo) structures do only not solve these...

I study agency problems between brokers and investors in the retail bond market. Thepresence of suitability or fiduciary regulations, which govern transactions in this setting, canlead to tensions for brokers between maximizing their own profit and acting in the best interestsof their customers....

We model the expected support of banks with credit ratings from Moody's and Fitch, taking explicitly into account the capacity and willingness of governments to provide support in case of need, as well as their concerns about moral hazard (i.e., that the expected support may induce banks to...

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for too big too fail and a rationale for constructive ambiguity. Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (little) incentive to...

This paper develops a model to analyse the optimal ex-ante capital and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements, and the ex-post resolution policy of banks. Banks in our model are subject to two types of moral hazard: i) ex-ante, they have the incentive to shirk on project monitoring,...

This paper studies optimal disclosure regulation for entrepreneurial public financing with post-financing moral hazard problem. I show that partial disclosure can improve social welfare over full disclosure through reducing efficiency loss caused by the moral hazard problem. As a result, a...

This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort (LOLR). In a simple one-period setting, the Central Bank (CB) should only rescue banks which are above a threshold size, thus providing an analytical basis for "too big too fail". We also provide a rationale for "constructive ambiguity"....

The objective of this research is to examine the inter-bank network of clients as a channel for credit risk transmission by groups of banks in Serbia characterized by different levels of credit risk (clusters). Two of the four observed groups of banks have experienced increase in NPLs through...

A growing literature exploits credit score cutoff rules used by mortgage lenders as a natural experiment to estimate the moral hazard effect of securitization on underwriting. This research design is premised on the assumption that these cutoff rules are a response by lenders to securitization...

This paper examines common regulation as cause of interbank contagion. Studies based on the correlation of bank assets and the extent of interbank lending may underestimate the likelihood of contagion because they do not incorporate the fact that banks have a common regulator. In our model, the...