Derivatives transactions create systemic risk by threatening to spread the consequences of default throughout the financial system. Responding to the manifestations of systemic risk exhibited in the financial crisis, policy-makers have sought to solve the problem by requiring as many derivatives...

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability insurance (Damp;O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect Damp;O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors:...

This Article examines how liability insurers transmit and transform the content of corporate and securities law. Damp;O liability insurers are the financiers of shareholder litigation in the American legal system, paying on behalf of the corporation and its directors and officers when...

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Further, controlling for...

This Article seeks what may be the holy grail of securities law scholarship - the role of the quot;meritsquot; in securities class actions - by investigating the relationship between settlements and Damp;O insurance. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with plaintiffs' and defense lawyers, Damp;O...

Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as...

We study the impact of Dead Hand Proxy Puts on shareholder value. Courts and commentators have characterized these terms as defenses against hedge fund activism that threaten to reduce firm value by entrenching underperforming managers and thereby increasing managerial agency costs. Our findings...