I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching …

concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a matching market, we introduce a desideratum based on fairness …

We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …

We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching … opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two … allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static …

assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Two-sided matching platforms can control and optimize over many aspects of the search for partners. To understand how … matching platforms should be designed, we introduce a dynamic two-sided search model with strategic agents who must bear a cost …