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This paper derives the effort-maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs. The organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments: he sets the value of the prize purse, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616568
This paper studies endogenous entry and ex ante revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have private-information entry costs. The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, we show that any equilibrium entry can be characterized through a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619326
This paper investigates the optimal (effort-maximizing) structure of multi-stage sequential-elimination contests with pooling competition in each stage. We allow the contest organizer to design the contest structure in two arms: contest sequence (the number of stages, and the number of remaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623287
This paper studies in a multiple-winner contest setting how the total efforts may vary between a grand contest and a set of subcontests. We first show that the rent-dissipation rate increases when the numbers of contestants and prizes are "scaled up". In other words, the total efforts of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623478
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371148
"This paper derives the effort-maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs. The organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments: the value of the prize purse and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008594038
This paper extends the pre-bid R&D and auctions design literature to an independent private value setting where each bidder incurs a private-information valuation discovery cost upon entry. The seller commits to a mechanism before the bidders' entry decisions. The main findings are as follows....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789550
This paper first derives revenue-maximizing auctions with identity-specific externalities among all players (seller and buyers). Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, a modified second-price sealed-bid auction with appropriate entry fees and reserve price is revenue-maximizing. Secondly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789678