French Abstract: Politique de divulgation dans des concours à la Tullock quand l'entrée est stochastique et asymétrique. On examine comment une politique de divulgation ou non du nombre des participants à un concours peut être optimisée pour donner des incitations aux participants quand...

In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplier's score is the difference between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procurer's payoff is the difference between the winner's quality...

We compare the Electoral College and the popular vote in a stylized two-candidate, three-district election game. Under the Electoral College, the winner of a district acquires all votes of the electorate; under the popular vote, each candidate acquires the votes s/he actually wins in each...

This paper studies optimal auction design when buyers’ value discovery investment is covert but essential for mutually beneficial trade between seller and buyers. Since selling mechanisms contingent on value discovery (e.g. ex ante fees charged upon information acquisition) are not feasible,...

This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, in which two objects are available for sale sequentially in different periods. When the buyer’s values of the two objects are independent, in contrast to conventional...

We show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi-battle dynamic model to investigate how the disutility from a protracted competition shapes agents' willingness to fight on. Our theory...

This paper provides a fully fledged equilibrium analysis for two-player sequential-move contests with complete information, while allowing for a full spectrum of the contest's accuracy and players' asymmetry. For a strong-lead contest, an interior equilibrium (both players are active) prevails...

In many real-life contests, contestants do not know their own type (e.g., value or ability) prior to a competition; and contestants’ types, which are observed privately once entering the contest, are often correlated with each other. We study a two-stage contest in which two players with...