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We identify an otherwise efficient market in which racial stereotypes affect market outcomes. In this market, there are well-defined prices, well-defined outcomes, a finite time horizon, and readily available information. The market appears to efficiently process the available information, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128735
We propose that the concept of cognitive dissonance contributes to the explanation of the regularity that wages grow faster than productivity. Cognitive dissonance is the tendency of a person to engage in self-justification after a decision. We show that a consequence of this tendency is that...
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We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...
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Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cognitive ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between significant measures of intelligence and measures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092208
We identify a largely efficient market in which racial biases affect market outcomes. Examining data on NBA games, we show that teams with more black players tend to face larger point spreads and that these teams perform worse against the spread. These biased outcomes are significantly large and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066813
In this paper we show how imperfect memory can imply a preference for increasing payments. We model an agent making a decision regarding effort in two periods where the cost of effort is imperfectly known. Before making the first decision, the agent receives a signal related to the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723575