Similar Search Results

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Iossa, Elisabetta - 2014

In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054426

Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts

Chaigneau, Pierre - In: Journal of business economics and management 16 (2015) 4, pp. 712-732

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383053

Robust contract designs : linear contracts and moral hazard

Yu, Yimin; Kong, Xiangyin - In: Operations research 68 (2020) 5, pp. 1457-1473

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301562

Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2021

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032

Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability

Reinshagen, Felix - 2012

We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239

Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship

Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By … relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under …-powered incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018

Merger efficiency and managerial incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013

obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. We derive conditions under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771