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The hold-down problem and the boundaries of the firm : lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option

Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - 2002

This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410683

The importance of being honest

Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 773-811

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a … known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty … ability to generate further successes. This, in turn, provides incentives for the agent to be honest before a first success. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671897

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706

Contract design with socially-attentive preferences

Koch, Simon; Sarbu, Miruna; Weinschenk, Philipp - 2019

assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393

Incentives for Contract Designers

Rodivilov, Alexander - 2021

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213552

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372