Bayesian experts with a common prior that are exposed to different types of evidence possibly make contradicting probabilistic forecasts. A policy maker who receives the forecasts must aggregate them in the best way possible. This is a challenge whenever the policy maker is not familiar with the...

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...

Consider a setting where many individuals make predictions over the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. An outside Bayesian observer, familiar with the common prior shared by the individuals, can aggregate this information and identify correctly the actual...

We consider extensive-form games in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may...

In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In...

In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In...