We analyze boundedly rational learning in social networks within binary action environments. We establish how learning outcomes depend on the environment (i.e., informational structure, utility function), the axioms imposed on the updating behavior, and the network structure. In particular, we...

This paper considers a dynamic duopoly market with strategic, price setting firms and an infinite set of fully rational, privately informed consumers who enter the market sequentially. I show that there exists a sequential equilibrium in which prices converge to their realized product qualities...

This paper considers a dynamic market with two firms that sell competing products. The products are offered to an infinite set of rational consumers each of whom observes conditionally independent private signals about the quality. Consumers enter the market sequentially, observe the market...

We analyze the firm-external effects of dynamic prices in a sequential market with a monopolistic firm. The product is offered to an infinite sequence of rational consumers each of whom observes a private signal regarding the product quality. We show that dynamic prices are necessary for...

We revisit the idea that robustness concerns can provide a foundation for simple mechanisms. Formally, we consider the robust implementation notion of continuous implementation (Oury and Tercieux, 2012), where continuity is with respect to players' hierarchy of beliefs. We define simplicity as...

This paper introduces a novel robustness concept for generic sets in function spaces. As motivation, I provide an economically relevant example of a functional property, where a subset of the domain with arbitrary small (Lebesgue) measure marks the difference between the functional property...

This paper considers a dynamic market with a strategic, price setting firm that knows the quality of the product it sells to an infinite set of rational consumers who enter the market sequentially and observe conditionally independent private signals about the quality. In equilibrium, the price...

We consider a strategic online social network that controls information flows between agents in a social learning setting. Agents on the network select among products of competing firms of unknown quality. The network sells advertising to firms. We consider display advertising, which is standard...

We analyze boundedly rational learning in social networks within binary action environments. We establish how learning outcomes depend on the environment (i.e., informational structure, utility function), the axioms imposed on the updating behavior, and the network structure. In particular, we...