Why don't successful venture capitalists eliminate excess demand for their follow-on funds by aggressively raising their performance fees? We propose a theory of learning that leads to informational hold-up in the VC market. Investors in a fund learn whether the VC has skill or was lucky,...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

We examine whether networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entryinto local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs bargaining power overentrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among theincumbent players experience less entry. The effect is...

We examine whether options granted to non-executive employees affect firm performance. Using new data on option programs, we explore the link between broad-based option programs, option portfolio implied incentives, and firm operating performance, utilizing an instrumental variables approach to...

We examine whether options granted to rank and file employees have effects on the performance of the firm, by exploring the link between broad-based option grants, option portfolio implied incentives and firm operating performance. We employ an instrumental variables approach that combines...

We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate...

Recent studies suggest that the underperformance of IPO's in the post-1970 sample may be a small sample effect or Peso problem. That is, IPO underperformance may be due to observing too few star performers ex-post than were expected ex-ante. We develop a model of IPO performance that captures...

I examine the effects of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of the entrepreneurial firm at the time of transition from private to public ownership. Using a selection model framework that instruments for venture backing with variations in the supply of venture capital, I conduct...