Cities and marketplaces are central to economic development, but we know little about why such agglomerations initially form. I argue that evolutionary forces select for agglomerations when individuals' desire to spatially coordinate exchange in complex environments. To test this idea, I perform...

This paper introduces a simple application of contest theory that neatly captures how Boulding’s “Loss of Strength Gradient” determines the geographic extent of territory. We focus on the “supply side” of territorial conflict, showing how the costs of initiating and escalating conflict...

In this paper, I create an econometric model of maps and explore the issues that arise from using endogenous unit areas for statistical inference. I first create a model of endogenous maps that nests a ``completely random map'' for empirical counterfactuals. I then estimate several competing...

We develop a principal-agent model where a police officer trades off investigating and patrolling in a rich strategic environment where civilians choose between producing and stealing (and also whom to steal from). The equilibrium numbers of criminals and producers, punished or not, are...

What caused the rise of ancient Greek city-states? To answer this question, I develop a model that synthesizes neo-institutionalist, neo-physiocrat, and neo-classical theories of development and advances a trade-based explanation consistent with the writing of classicists. Then, with a new...

How does the size of the governing coalition affect the amount and type of violence in society? This paper combines models of the selectorate with stationary bandits to predict that larger coalitions substitute away from fighting for private goods (such as plunder) towards fighting for public...