This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the...

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the...

This paper investigates the effects of acquisitions by “big techs” on venture capital (VC) funding for start-up companies. Because of the strong association between VC investment and innovation, this approach also sheds light on the repercussions of big tech start-up acquisitions on...

This paper studies the interactions between corporate law and VC exits by acquisitions, an increasingly common source of VC-related litigation. We find that transactions by VC funds under liquidity pressure are characterized by (i) a substantially lower sale price; (ii) a greater probability of...

We find that targets backed by venture capital (VC) syndication receive higher acquisition premiums and spend more time negotiating transaction terms. The acquirers of syndicate-backed targets experience lower cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcements; however, they...

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We apply this theory to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's...

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation...

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We apply this theory to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's...

Gaining a “window” on new technologies is a prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) investing. Recent studies suggest that information gained through CVC-related activities can improve the internal R&D productivity of established firms. This study investigates an alternative...

This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation...