We develop a dynamic model of decentralized finance (DeFi) lending that incorporates two/these key features: 1) borrowing and lending are decentralized, anonymous, overcollateralized and backed by the market value of crypto assets where contract terms are pre-specified and rigid; and 2)...

We develop a dynamic model of decentralized finance (DeFi) lending that incorporates two/these key features: 1) borrowing and lending are decentralized, anonymous, overcollateralized and backed by the market value of crypto assets where contract terms are pre-specified and rigid; and 2)...

We develop a dynamic model of DeFi lending that incorporates the following key features: 1) borrowing and lending are decentralized, anonymous, overcollaterlized, and backed by the market value of crypto assets where contract terms are pre-specified and rigid; and 2) information friction exists...

We highlight the multiplier role of (public) safe assets by studying a model of a bank’s balance sheet. The bank optimally constructs a portfolio of safe and risky assets and designs its liabilities. Holding costly but adverse-selection-free safe assets multiplies the production of risky...

We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of firms. Each firm's manager exerts costly hidden effort. The productivity of effort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reflect their performance...