We study time-consistent debt policies in a trade-off model of debt in which the firm can freely issue new debt and repurchase existing debt. A debt policy is time-consistent if in any state equityholders prefer to follow it rather than to deviate from it but lose credibility in sustaining debt...

In many cases, buyers are not informed about their valuations and rely on experts, who are informed but biased for overbidding. We study auction design when selling to such “advised buyers”. We show that a canonical dynamic auction, the English auction, has a natural equilibrium that...

In procurement auctions, suppliers' senior managers in charge of bidding often rely on advisors, such as project managers and technical specialists, to evaluate project costs. These advisors may be biased for inflating the costs due to agency or career concerns. We study the procurement agency's...

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Assets range in the degree of standardization from less standardized real estate or municipal bonds to more standardized futures or Treasuries. I study bargaining over a non-standardized asset between sophisticated investors who possess precise private information about its value to parties. The...

In over-the-counter markets, the presence of two frictions is central to determine prices, liquidity, and efficiency: the search friction reflected in how long it takes to find a trading opportunity and the bargaining friction reflected in how promptly gains from trade are realized once the...

In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...