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Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay

Haman, Janto - 2012

Convergence in CEO pay occurs when pay differentials narrow over time. We analyze and compare differences in the rate of convergence in CEO pay of Australian listed firms with high shareholding concentration (HSC) and without, for the period 1992 to 2009. We find zero and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097908

Ironing Out the Kinks in Executive Compensation : Linking Incentive Pay to Average Stock Prices

Tian, Yisong S. - 2012

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100690

Evidence-Based Executive Pay : Remunerating for Shareholder Value

Wilson, Amanda - 2013

Prevailing executive pay practices rest on fallacious assumptions about performance attribution, the nature of alignment, and the psychology of incentives, and have numerous unintended consequences that are value-destructive particularly for long term and diversified shareholders. The focus of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086295

The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts

Lund, Andrew - 2014

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058

Asymmetry of CEO Compensation and the Role of Relative and Macroeconomic Shocks in Risk Taking Incentives

Chiu, Hsin-Hui - 2015

If managers are risk-averse and compensation schemes are not directly linked to shareholder wealth, incentives to … then show how serial correlation in shocks, the relative variance of shocks and the ability of managers to influence the … asymmetric incentives in these two variables. Thus, if managers are risk-averse, their incentives to reduce the impact of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014268

New Trends in the Regulation of Executive Remuneration

Hill, Jennifer G. - 2020

This paper, which was first presented as a conference paper at the Annual 2009 Supreme Court of New South Wales Conference in June 2009, considers the impact of the global financial crisis on the regulation of executive pay in a range of common law jurisdictions, including the United States, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857590

Are CEOS Paid Extra for Riskier Pay Packages?

Albuquerque, Ana M.; Albuquerque, Rui A.; Carter, Mary Ellen - 2021

This paper estimates the risk premium in CEO incentive compensation. Using detailed U.S. CEO contract compensation data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages are paid more. The estimated risk premium from total incentive pay represents 15% of total pay. We further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213692

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola - 2010

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145369

The ISS Pay for Performance Model

O'Byrne, Stephen F. - 2013

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) announced a new approach to evaluating pay for performance in late 2011. This paper explains the new approach, highlights four significant weaknesses of the new approach and explains how ISS could substantially improve its Pay for Performance Model, now...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079567

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - 2021

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316120