We examine the relation between consumer search and equilibrium prices when collusion is endogenously determined. We develop a theoretical model and show that average price is a U-shaped function of the measure of searchers: prices are highest when there are no searchers (local monopoly power)...

This note is concerned with the effects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can...

Fees for banking services have been a policy concern for over 20 years and the subject of several government agencies studies, which focused on the magnitude, incidence, or disclosure of such fees. Using a sample of single market banks, I study the relationship between market-level consumer...

This paper studies the effects of vertical integration on innovation in the chipset and smartphone industries. I formulate and estimate a dynamic structural model of a dominant upstream chipset maker and downstream smartphone handset makers. The two sides make dynamic investment decisions and...

I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing entry of superior inputs, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and competition in prices. The merger is profitable by solving Cournot complementarity...

There is not a day goes by without a passionate debate concerning Big Tech companies; while the main concern of governments seems to be related to social justice, a growing worry is associated with the consequences that large firms have on consumer welfare; nowadays these big entities engage in...

We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature witha view toward competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition canemerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underlinethe role of dynamics, but also of platform...

We examine the relation between consumer search and equilibrium prices when collusion is endogenously determined. We develop a theoretical model and show that average price is a U-shaped function of the measure of searchers: prices are highest when there are no searchers (local monopoly power)...

The next generation of e-commerce will be conducted by digital agents, based on algorithms that will not only make purchase recommendations, but will also predict what we want, make purchase decisions, negotiate and execute the transaction for the consumers, and even automatically form...