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This article examines the mechanisms used by venture capitalists (VCs) to monitor their investments in startups that use trade secrets to protect their intellectual property (IP). First, we confirm that, after startups are afforded stronger trade secrets protection by the adoption of the Uniform...
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We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012721864
This paper examines the relationship between investor protection and corporate insiders' incentive to take value-enhancing risks. In a poor investor protection environment corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate considerable corporate resources as personal benefits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726576
This paper examines the relationship between investor protection and corporate insiders' incentive to take value-enhancing risks. In a poor investor protection environment corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate considerable corporate resources as personal benefits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734061
We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012736650
We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769265