Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic eects of electoral rules and political regimes...

Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth...

using a general equilibrium model with maximising agents, the transmission of disturbances under alternative exchange rate regimes are analysed and compared. Expectations of future prices and monetary policies are crucial to the analysis. Apart from specific results, the paper also provides an...

The problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources. First, as shown by Guillermo A. Calvo (1978), the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation. Second, as discussed by Robert E. Lucas and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), there is an...

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy-the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment-can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise...

The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and...