This paper shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability in the sense of either Pathak and Sönmez (2013) or Arribillaga and Massó (2015) without compromising with stability. A conflict between manipulability and fairness is also...

I study how a matching platform's design affects users' welfare and probability of matching (outcomes) and the strategic decisions behind such a design. I consider a two-sided matching model in which each agent has a limited number of prospects. An increase in agents' number of prospects has two...

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic...

We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such...

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the...

A choice rule with affirmative action decides on the recipients of a limited number of identical objects by reconciling two objectives: respecting a priority ordering over the applicants and supporting a minority group. We introduce axioms on choice rules based on the principle that affirmative...

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...

School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the same time, underrepresented minority students should be favored to close the opportunity gap. A common way to achieve this is to have a majority quota at each school, and to require that no school be assigned...